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Price promotions are important marketing activities for (food) retailers; brand loyalty is a major requisite to 
foster brands' assets. Several theoretical papers have analyzed the relationship between price promotions and 
brand loyalty resulting in mixed or perhaps contradictory outcomes; only a few empirical studies for (European) 
grocery markets are available to test which model(s) might be most relevant to reflect pricing strategies in food 
retailing. In this analysis, two detailed data sets for the German ready-to-eat breakfast cereals market are merged 
to  investigate  the  relationship  between  price  promotions  and  brand  loyalty.  We  find  significant  empirical 
evidence that stronger brands tend to be promoted less frequently at lower discounts compared to weaker brands. 
The reason might be that price reductions are more costly for brands having loyal customers who are willing to 
accept higher mark-ups. Therefore stronger brands might need to come up with alternative measures to recruit 
new customers instead of offering attractive promotional sales. 
 
Keywords:  Price  Promotion,  Brand  Loyalty,  Food  Retailing,  Ready-to-Eat  Cereals,  Germany,  Instruments, 
Tobit  
1.  Introduction 
 
Promotional sales in various forms such as price promotions, coupons or displays are dominant features in the 
grocery business marketing mix around the globe. In the German sector of food retailing price promotions are 
the most frequent instrument to attract customers or to increase sales. For example, consumers find significant 
temporary  price  reductions  for  coffee  (chocolate  or  frozen  pizza)  in  one  of  five  (ten)  weeks  in  combined 
supermarkets in Germany.
1 Ready-to-eat breakfast cereals are regularly price promoted as well. Particular brands 
in certain retail outlets are put on sale up to 24 % of the time. Average discounts are set between 8% and 15%.  
Several attempts have been undertaken in the economic and marketing literature to explain the occurrence of 
sales. In the first models discrimination between informed and uniformed consumers leads to a mixed pricing 
strategy in which either high or low prices are set in most periods (Varian, 1980). Other arguments to result price 
promotions within an equilibrium mixed strategy are based on  household storage (Blattberg et al., 1981), loss 
leader (Lal and Matutes, 1984), differences in the reference prices between consumers (Sobel, 1984) or 
transaction cost differentials between consumers (Narasimhan, 1984). All these models do not consider th at 
pricing strategies within a grocery store differ for the various products or brands offered. Narasimhan (1988) 
first proposes a model that leads to different pricing strategies within a store for brands. He argues that brand 
loyal customers might play a critical role for the pricing strategy of manufacturers and/or retailers.  
Driven by empirical observations of deviating pricing policies between brands (strong and weak with respect to 
the degree of loyalty, large and small with respect to the number of  loyal customers) in the same store, for 
instance in regard to the price promotional strategy, various authors have developed models to explain the 
observed behavior in a rational equilibrium framework. The main feature analyzed is whether or not and how a 
set of customers loyal to different brands influences the promotional strategy of brands, especially the impact on 
the frequency (frequency) of promotional sales und the level of the promotional price reduction (depth). 
Significant contributions to the pro blem can be found in Raju et al. (1990), Rao (1991), Agrawal (1996), 
Anderson and Kumar (2007), Jing and Wen (2008) and Ko￧aş and Bohlmann (2008).  For these models no 
unambiguous result is obtained; depending on the setting almost every outcome is possible which calls for rigid 
empirical testing to decide which approach might be relevant to the real world. 
To date very few comprehensive empirical studies on the impact of brand loyalty on frequency and depth of 
price promotions have been published, in particular employing data from (European) retail markets. Agrawal 
(1996) analyses seven different product categories in the US food retail market and finds that stronger brands are 
promoted less often but more deeply. Ko￧aş and Bohlmann (2008) use data for books sold online and reveals 
that price promotional strategies depend on the ratio of loyal to price-sensitive consumers. Smaller brands are 
                                                 
1 See Schaper and Loy (2010). Hosken and Reiffen (2004: 137) and Berck et al. (2008: 1261) show for the US that twenty 
to fifty percent of stores‟ product price variation can be attributed to variations due to sales‟ prices. 2 
 
found to be promoted more often at higher discounts. Allender and Richards (2009) investigate the market for 
breakfast cereals in the United States using a household scanner data sample. They find a negative correlation 
between the degree of brand loyalty and frequency as well as depth of price promotions. 
The present study uses a combination of two detailed data sets for the breakfast cereals market in Germany. To 
measure brand loyalty we employ a household panel data set which records the actual consumption behavior of 
14.000 households in the period from 2000 to 2001. The brand specific retail price promotional strategy is 
derived from a retail scanner data set for 108 retailers in Germany over the same period which is very likely to 
result in more reliable estimators of brand specific promotional strategies compared to a household scanner 
panel. To test the impact of brand loyalty on promotional pricing strategies in the empirical model, we also 
include certain aspects that might interact in this relationship such as manufacturer and retail chain specific 
effects that to our knowledge have not been considered in the literature so far. The empirical model provides 
strong evidence for a negative impact of the degree brand loyalty on the magnitude (depth) and frequency 
(frequency)  of  price  promotions.  This  main  result  is  robust  over  different  specifications  and  empirical 
measurements of brand loyalty and promotional sales. Stronger brands are promoted less often with shallower 
discounts compared to weak brands. On the contrary, the size of the loyal segment positively influences the 
frequency and depth of price promotions. But even though this result is statistically significant, the size of the 
coefficients, namely the economic relevance, is negligibly small. Suppliers often charge the reservation price for 
strong brands and promote weak brands in the competition for non loyal consumer segments. In a dynamic 
perspective, this result could imply that stronger brands need to look for alternative promotional strategies to 
attract new customers and to keep their loyal consumer segment. 
The paper is organized as follows. In section two, we briefly review the existing literature on the relationship 
between  price  promotions  and  brand  loyalty.  In  the  following  section,  the  data  sets  are  presented.  Some 
descriptive statistics of measures of price promotion and brand loyalty are shown. In section four we develop the 
model specification, report and discuss estimation results. Finally, we summarize our findings.  
2.  Brief Literature Review 
 
Brand  loyalty  describes  consumers‟  attitude  or  behavior  that  directly  effects  the  consumption  decision  and 
thereby determines retailers‟ optimal pricing strategies. In most models brand loyal behavior is either defined by 
the maximum price differential consumers are willing to accept before they switch to price reduced brands 
(degree of loyalty) and/or by the size of the loyal consumer segments (extent of loyalty). Brands might differ 
with respect to the level of loyalty and/or the size of their loyal consumer segment. A strong brand has either 
customers who accept a high price differential before they switch to another brand or a large brand has many 
loyal customers (large loyal segment).  
The predominant feature of the models is represented by the trade-off between either charging a higher price to 
loyal  customers  (loyal  segments)  or  being  the  low  price  alternative  in  the  market  to  win  the  shoppers  or 
customers that are normally loyal to other brands, e.g. by offering high and frequent discounts. “The two key 
comparative statics of interest are the average depth of discounts and the frequency of promotions” (Narasimhan, 
1988). Existing theoretical models however differ in their particular set-up in which often small modifications 
can lead to significant changes in comparative static results. Even parameter variations under the same model set 
can us lead to different conclusions.  
Narasimhan (1988) for example shows that both brands grant the same discount. The larger brand promotes less 
often. However, “if the switchers are willing to pay a premium to one of the brands, ….a premium price brand in 
general will offer a higher average discount and also promote more often unless its share of the loyal segment is 
very large”  (Narasimhan, 1988:  441).  
In their seminal contribution, Raju et al. (1990) investigate the simultaneous pricing strategies of two competing 
manufacturers. Consumers are loyal towards either one of the brands and the degree of brand loyalty differs 
between brands. The authors argue that the stronger brand promotes less often but more deeply. The weaker 
brand uses promotions for defensive purposes by giving incentives to its loyal customers not to switch, while the 
stronger brand aggressively tries to attract customers that are loyal to the weaker brand.  3 
 
Rao (1991) assumes that the two manufacturers sequentially choose the regular price as well as the frequency 
and depth of price promotions. Thus, manufacturers are able to react on each other‟s decisions. In his model, 
only  one  manufacturer (the  „stronger‟ firm)  has  loyal  clients. The loyal  clients‟  willingness  to  pay  a  price 
premium for their favorite brand differs across consumers. In the mixed strategy equilibrium, the weaker brand 
pursues an „every day low price‟ (EDLP) strategy with a lower regular price and no price promotions. The 
stronger brand chooses a higher regular price but engages in price promotional activities. In this outcome of the 
sequential game both price setting strategies function as a defensive tool to keep the loyal customers at the strong 
brand and the non-loyal consumers at the EDLP brand.  
Narasimhan (1988), Raju et al. (1990) as well as Rao (1991) do not consider the influence of a retailer located 
between manufacturers and consumers on the pricing strategy which in particular for food products is likely to 
be important. The food retail chains in Germany and many other places are highly concentrated and sell several 
brands for most food items. The execution of market power over small and medium size food processors and the 
consumers might also be an issue especially at the regional level. Agrawal (1996) extends former models by 
including a monopoly retailer who sells (both) manufacturers‟ brands. The retailer faces two options: Option one 
is to sell both brands at the consumers‟ reference price to the respective loyal segment. Option two is to offer 
either  one  of  the  brands  on  promotion  to  target  the  entire  market  in  the  respective  period.  To  do  so,  the 
promotional depth needs to exceed the level of loyalty of the respective other brand. Because the level of loyalty 
is higher for the stronger firm, discounts for the weaker brand need to be higher. As this option is costly for the 
retailer (loss by the price reduction in the loyal segment), it is used less often. Agrawal‟s (1996) option two 
results that the stronger (weaker) brand will be promoted more (less) often but less (more) strongly. 
While earlier models (Raju et al. 1990, Rao 1991 and Agrawal 1996) assume in general that all consumers are 
loyal towards a specific brand, more recent studies (Anderson and Kumar 2007, Ko￧aş and Bohlmann 2008, Jing 
and Wen 2008) include switching consumer segments. Also in Anderson and Kumar (2007), brand loyalty is no 
longer  modeled  as  a  static  characteristic  of  consumers;  firms  can  transform  price-sensitive  consumers 
(„switchers‟) into loyal clients. The firms differ in the power to create customer loyalty. A fraction of the price-
sensitive segment becomes loyal to the brand being the cheapest one in the period before. The stronger firm is 
able to convince a larger share to become loyal. The trade-off that firms face in this model is to either “harvest” 
its loyal segment by charging a higher price or to invest in potential new loyal customer by lowering the price. In 
equilibrium, the stronger firm promotes more often and deeper as its persuading power is higher: the size of the 
price-sensitive segment is positively related to the depth and frequency of discount. 
Ko￧aş  and  Bohlmann  (2008)  investigate  price  competition  between  three  retailers  (but  do  not  include  the 
upstream manufacturers‟ pricing decisions). Retailers differ in the size of their loyal consumer segment as well 
as how many price-sensitive consumers are aware of their prices. Again, the equilibrium is characterized by the 
trade-off between charging a high price to the loyal clients and lowering prices to capture a higher market share. 
The authors extend the model by determining the optimal pricing strategies contingent on the ratio between price 
sensitive and loyal customers. Compared to the smallest retailer, the large retailer can either have a smaller or 
higher „sensitive to loyal ratio‟. If the ratio is higher, the stronger retailer promotes more often and offers a larger 
discount. 
Depending upon the nature of products, Jing and Wen (2008) differentiate between three different levels of 
overall brand loyalty: high, intermediate or low. Consumers are divided into two segments, consumers who are 
loyal to the stronger brand and price sensitive consumers. The authors investigate the impact of different levels 
of brand loyalty and also distinguish between markets according to the relative size of respective consumer 
segments  (larger  loyal  or  large  price  sensitive  consumer  segment),  so  that  finally  six  different  equilibrium 
solutions occur. In general, with an increasing price sensitive segment both brands will offer deeper and more 
frequent promotions. The stronger brand will promote more aggressively when the overall degree of brand 
loyalty is lower because it is less profitable to absorb the higher willingness to pay of its loyal segment.  
In conclusion we can summarize that the resulting pricing equilibriums vary depending on the model‟s set up. 
The models differ in the way the consumer‟s are modeled (inclusion of a switching segment, number of loyal 
groups), the number of players (duopoly or triopoly), the distributional channel (inclusion of a common retailer), 
the way the decisions are made (simultaneously or sequentially) and whether dynamic aspects are incorporated. 4 
 
Crucial is also how the asymmetry between the brands is realized. Do the brands differ with respect to the level 
of loyalty or segment size?  
Some  models  match  in  several  assumptions  but  nevertheless  come  to  diverging  conclusions  because  the 
emerging  equilibriums  are  contingent  on  the  interaction  of  all  assumptions  being  imposed.  Identifying 
assumptions leading to certain predictions is impossible, as the effects are overlaid. 
The major predictions regarding the impact of brand loyalty on the frequency and depth of price promotions 
described above are briefly summarized in the following graphs (Figure 1). 
 



































































Figure 1 shows the relationship between the depth (the discounted price relative to the regular price) on the x-
axis and the frequency of the price promotion (the cumulative probability of price promotions) on the y-axis for 
a strong or large (continuous line) and a weak or small brand (dotted line). In panel (a), the stronger brand offers 
smaller average discounts and promotes less frequently compared with the weak brand. Increasing brand loyalty 
is associated with less frequent and also smaller promotions (as suggested by Ko￧aş and Bohlmann (2008) when 
the weakest retailer has relatively few loyal customers). Panel (b) suggests that the stronger brand offers more 
and deeper discounts, a hypothesis put forward by Anderson and Kumar (1200) as well as Ko￧aş and Bohlmann 
(2008) in the case of more price-sensitive consumers being aware of the stronger firm. Panel (c) in Figure 1 
corresponds to the findings reported in Agrarwal (1996): a high degree of brand loyalty is associated with more 
frequent but smaller price promotions. The reverse case is pictured in panel (e). The remaining three panels are 
visualizations of equilibrium solutions derived by Jing and Wen (2008). In panel (f) the average discounts equal, 
whereas in panel (d) and (g) the frequencies of promotions match. In presence of large loyal segments, the 
stronger brand promotes deeper to defend them (panel (g)).  The frequencies of price promotions are mainly 
driven by the overall level of brand loyalty. Panel (f) represents a market of high brand loyalty, thus the stronger 
brand chooses to absorb its loyal clients‟ willingness to pay, whereas in panel (d) and (g) the overall level of 
brand loyalty drops so that the stronger brand intensifies its efforts to compete for the switching consumers and 
promotes relatively more often.  
3.  Data and Definition of Variables     
We use two detailed data sets for the German ready-to-eat breakfast cereals market; a household scanner and a 
retail  scanner  data  set.  The  household  scanner  data  set  is  provided  by  the  GfK  (Gesellschaft  für 
Konsumforschung: Association for Consumer Research) for the years 2000 and 2001. This data set includes the 
reporting of about 14,000 households on their daily food purchases. Each purchased product can be identified by 
its EAN (European Article Number). Further information about the point of sale, the date of purchase, price 
promotions and information on household characteristics such as household size, employment and age of the 
household lead are also available in the data set. This data is ideal to study the consumer behavior at the 
household level, e.g. to measuring the level and the extent of brand loyalty in the read-to-eat cereals market. 
To evaluate the dynamics of individual store's price setting, complete panels of store prices are needed. The 
consumer scan data at hand do not allow identifying individual stores. Further prices are not available for every 
week and store. Also the price reporting shows some deficiencies. Einav et al. (2010) find that reporting of 
prices within Nielsen Homescan data is of limited quality due to self-reporting of prices and promotions. In 
particular price promotions are likely to be over represented in the sample.
2 Therefore, we use a second data base 
that directly reports prices and volumes at the individual store‟s level. The retail scanner data set is provided by 
MaDaKom GmbH (Markt-Daten-Komunikation: market data communication). The data covers 104 weeks from 
January 2000 to December 2001 which matches the time span the GfK data is available. The data reports 
individual (EAN) product prices, volumes, promotions etc. for 108 retailers located throughout Germany.
3 Stores 
are classified by size, number of checkouts, location, and affiliation to a retail chain. Retailers provide additional 
information on specific marketing instruments such as specia l packing, display, feature, or price promotion of 
the products. The data is reported on a weekly basis.  
The ready-to-eat breakfast cereals market has been frequently studied in economics and marketing (see Ne vo, 
2001, Allender and Richards 2009). The market is characterized by high concentration ratios, high price -cost 
margins, large advertising to sales ratios and numerous introductions of new products (Nevo, 2001). These 
                                                 
2 Though households scan the products purchased, they have to enter price manually from the receipt. The latter is likely to 
be a source of error. As households are expected to buy products on sale more often, the appearance of sales is inherently 
over represented in the Homescan sample. 
3 This data set does not include two German EDLP discounters, Aldi and Lidl. Given the focus of our study (to analyze the 
impact of brand loyalty on retailers‟ price promotions), this is not serious problem since Aldi and Lidl pursue an EDLP 
strategy and never use price promotions.  6 
 
market characteristics - particularly the oligopolistic market structure - match the assumptions made in many 
theoretical models. Another important requisite in the models is that products are highly substitutable, processed 
by different manufacturers and are marketed under different brands. For ready-to-eat breakfast cereals these 
assumptions seem very plausible (Scherer and Ross, 1990).  
We  match  household  and  retail  scanner  data  by  products  and  stores  available  in  both  data  sets.  As  some 
important retail chains do not publish or sell data to market research companies, MaDaKom only cover parts of 
the market. For example, private labels sold by Aldi or Lidl (important discounters with a significant market 
share), are not reported in the retail scan data set. In both samples we find the same 129 EAN out of a total of 
142 in the retail scan and 375 in the home scan data set. From these we select only products with a market share 
greater than one percent based on the retail scan data set and with a significant number of consumers who bought 
the respective product over the entire period in the GfK sample. In the final matched sample we selected 23 sub 
brands which belong to four corporate brands, namely Kellogg‟s, Nestl￩, Dr. Oetker and Kölln.  
To investigate the relationship between price promotions and brand loyalty, measures for both terms need to be 
constructed.  We  follow  Hermann  et  al.  (2005)  and  define  a  price  promotion  based  on  the  following  three 
conditions: (a) the price of a particular product is at least 5% below the regular price
4, b) the duration of a price 
promotion does not exceed four weeks, and (c) following a price promotion the price rises. Price promotions are 
calculated for each EAN code separately for products being sold over the entire period.
5 The analysis builds 
upon 1,729 price series from 108 di fferent retailers belonging to five different retail chains or key accounts 
(Metro, Markant, Tengelmann, Edeka and Rewe).
6  
 
Figure 2: Empirical Pricing Distributions  
 
 
Main features of price promotional strategies are the frequency and depth of price promotions. Among the 
brands in the sample which have been promoted at least once, the average promotional frequency is 6.12 percent, 
i.e. on average 1 out of 16 items are on sale in a given time period. The average depth of promotions is 14.4 
                                                 
4 A price is called regular if it is in effect in four consecutive weeks. 
5  The MaDaKom provided a definition and calculated dummy variable according to the definition. However, the dummy 
variable did show some miscalculations; therefore a new indicator variable is calculated based on the MaDaKom definition 
of a promotional price. 
6 As we only considered price series with less than 20% missing observations, the number of observations reduces from  
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percent. 1729 observations remain in our sample; each time series represents one of 23 sub-brands at one of 108 
retailers. For 60 % of the time series at least one price promotion is observed. The substantial variation in price 
promotional features underlines the importance of analyzing retailers and brands individually without averaging 
over brands as in Agrawal (1996) or Allender and Richards (2009).  
The empirical relationship between depth and frequency of price promotions aggregated on corporate brand level 
is illustrated in Figure 2. On average, Nestl￩ promotes most often and offers relatively deep discounts. Kellogg‟s 
and Kölln‟s cumulative distribution of relative prices lies almost parallel to Nestl￩‟s. Thus, one can conclude that 
both promote less often and provide smaller price reductions. Dr. Oetker, who is only represented through two 
sub-brands in our sample, promotes more often offering shallower discounts compared to Kellogg‟s. This results 
in a cumulative probability line intersecting with Kellogg‟s. Compared to the seven different cases shown in 
Figure 1, the actual empirical distribution most closely resembles panels (a) and (b). The cumulative pricing 
distributions are almost parallel to each other, implying a complementary relationship between the depth and 
frequency of price reductions. Either a brand offers strong and frequent or small and infrequent price discounts.  
 
Since it was first mentioned by Copeland in 1923, the concept of brand loyalty is comprehensively discussed in 
the literature. Empirical measures are classified into measures only considering the behavioral or attitudinal 
component  of  brand  loyalty  and  those  of  a  composite  nature.  Behavioral  measures  evaluate  a  consumer‟s 
purchase  history  using  e.g.  panel  data,  whereas  attitudinal  measures  explore  a  consumer‟s  attitude  towards 
competing brands e.g. though a questionnaire. Rundle-Thiele and Bennett (2001) presented a survey of this 
literature and found that in the market of fast moving consumer goods (FMCG) it is valid to apply behavioral 
measures. The behavioral measures of brand loyalty can be grouped into proportion-of-purchase, sequence-of-
purchase, probability-of-purchase, synthesis and miscellaneous measures. As our research focuses on ready-to-
eat breakfast cereals which belong to the class of FMGC and as the operationalization of brand loyalty is still 
highly debated among brand loyalty researchers, we chose three different measures.  
A survey of this literature is presented by Rundle-Thiele and Bennett (2001). On the basis of scanner data it is 
impossible to estimate the price differential between brands that consumers are willing to accept before they 
switch  to  alternative  brands.  This  measure  is  typically  used  to  define  brand  loyalty  in  theoretical  models. 
However, brand loyalty is also assessable by analyzing consumption patterns in time. In this study we apply 
three  well  known  measures,  namely  average  length  of  the  brand  run,  repurchase  probability,  and  return 
probability. We define and apply all measures at the level of the sub-brand to allow as much flexibility and 
extract as much information as possible. Thereby, we allow loyalty to differ for the various sub-brands that are 
summarized under the corporate brands.  
A brand run is defined as a consecutive sequence of purchases of the same brand by one particular household. 
The average length of the brand run is the average number of consecutive purchases of a particular brand for 
each household over the entire period. The repurchase probability is calculated from a first-order Markov matrix 
and gives the probability of purchasing a particular brand again conditional on a previous purchase of the same 
sub-brand occasion. The return probability measures the probability of returning to a particular brand conditional 
on a previous purchase of another sub-brand. 
All  three  measures  of  brand  loyalty  are  computed  for  each  household  for  all  23  sub-brands  and  are  then 
aggregated over all households. A household is labeled as loyal towards a brand a, if its degree of loyalty is 
highest for brand a. To aggregate the results on brand level, we count all household being loyal towards a brand 
(segment size) and average of the loyalty scores of these loyal households (degree of loyalty).   
 
The variables entering our model are summarized in Table 1. Price promotions are characterized through two 
variables, namely the depth and frequency of price reductions. Our core variable to describe the brands is the 
degree of loyalty, estimated in three alternative ways. As some theoretical models also define brand loyalty 
according to the size of the loyal segments, we also include the segment sizes. Finally, retail chain, format and 






Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 
   Mean  Standard Deviation  Min   Max  
Dependent Variables             
Depth of Price Promotions   0.08  0.08  0  0.6 
Frequency of Price Promotions   0.04  0.05  0  0.24 
Independent Variables             
Degree of Loyalty – Brand Loyalty  4.73  1.11  2.58  7.87 
Segment Size – Brand Loyalty  131.94  107.6  12  336 
Degree of Loyalty – Repurchase Prob.  0.52  0.06  0.26  0.63 
Segment Size – Repurchase Prob.  125.18  92.32  8  299 
Degree of Loyalty – Return Probability  0.70  0.05  0.61  0.83 
Segment Size – Return Probability   78.52  57.63  5  189 
Edeka   0.26  0.44  0  1 
Markant   0.16  0.37  0  1 
Metro   0.27  0.45  0  1 
Rewe   0.13  0.34  0  1 
Tengelmann   0.13  0.33  0  1 
Misc.   0.05  0.22  0  1 
Discounter    0.06  0.24  0  1 
Dr. Oetker   0.07  0.26  0  1 
Kellogg„s   0.69  0.46  0  1 
Koelln   0.04  0.19  0  1 
Nestlé   0.2  0.4  0  1 
 
4.  Model Specification and Estimation Results 
 
To  test  the  impact  of  brand  loyalty  on  price  promotional  strategies,  we  estimate  three  different  model 
specifications for the two dependent variables respectively (the frequency and depth of price promotions). The 
model specifications only differ in the measure of brand loyalty that is used (see above for the definition of 
brand runs, repurchase probabilities, and return probabilities). Both dependent variables are left censored. About 
40 percent of the time series under study do not indicate any price promotions and are represented by a zero, thus 
we employ a Tobit model.  
As raised by Huang et al. (2006) another concern is the potential endogeneity of the measures of brand loyalty. 
Price promotional strategies are used to influence consumers‟ purchasing decisions and thus might determine the 
level of brand loyalty. The rejection of the null hypothesis in the Wu-Hausmann-test of exogeneity at the 5% 
significance level for five of the six specifications indicates that the OLS estimator might deliver inconsistent 
estimates  (Hausman,  1978).  We  apply  a  two  stage  Instrumental-Variable  Tobit  Model  (IVTobit)  by  using 
household characteristics as well as retailer and manufacturer dummies as instruments to extract brand loyalty 
that is exogenous to the model specification.  
 
In Table 2 parameter estimates for the impact of three different measures of brand loyalty on the frequency 
(columns 1 to 3) and depth of price promotions (columns 4 to 6) are reported. Across all specifications we find a 
significant negative coefficient for the degree of brand loyalty. Stronger brands are promoted less often and 
strong brand are promoted at lower discounts. This finding is consistent with theoretical models of Jing and Wen 9 
 
(2008) and Ko￧aş and Bohlmann (2008) (compare Figure 1, panel (a)). Jing and Wen (2008) predict stronger 
brands to promote less often and to provide a smaller discount in a market with a large segment of price-
sensitive  consumers.  The  weaker  brand  targets  its  pricing  strategy  at  price-sensitive  customers  instead  of 
invading the stronger brand‟s loyal customer base. Thus, the stronger brand is not forced to act aggressively in 
the market.  
Table 2 further suggests that brands with a larger loyal customer segment are being promoted more aggressively 
by stronger brands. The number of households counted loyal towards a brand is labeled as segment size.
7 Similar 
results are obtained when the market share is used as an explanatory variable instead; the explanat ory power of 
the model is somewhat lower in this case. Brands with a larger segment of loyal consumers (larger market share) 
are more often on sale and their price discounts are larger, ceteris paribus. These results are in contrast to Van 
Oest and Franses (2005), who suggest that the stronger brand promotes more often and offers a larger discount,  
and correspond to Jing and Wen (2008), Hosken and Reiffen (2004) as well as Lal and Matutes (1989, 1994). 
These authors investigate how differences in the „popularity‟ of goods affect their probability of being on sale 
and argue that „within groups of products that are close substitutes, more popular products are more likely to go 
on sales than less popular products‟ (Hosken and Reiffen, 2004: 154).   
Comparing the effects of the degree of loyalty to the size of the loyal segment, we find that the degree of loyalty 
is of greater economic importance. Even though the segment size coefficients are statistically significant, their 
coefficients are extremely small.  
The coefficients of the retail chain and manufacturer dummies are also highly significant and consistent across 
the different models. Especially the discounters promote less aggressively (Table 2 suggests a significantly lower 
frequency of sales and depth of price promotions for this format) which is in line with their “Everyday Low 
Price Strategy”. Manufacturer specific effects indicate that Nestl￩ – the runner up in the market behind Kellogg‟s 
– prices more aggressively in terms of offering larger and more frequent discounts.  
 
We have also carried out a number of specification tests to evaluate the stability of our empirical results. To 
obtain  valid  results  from  an  IV  regression,  each  instrument  needs  to  satisfy  two  conditions:  instrumental 
relevance and instrumental exogeneity. Instrumental relevance can only be defended on theoretical grounds. 
Household characteristics are found to influence the extent of brand loyalty for food products in Wettstein et al. 
(2009), thus we use household income and size as instrumental variables. In the first stage regressions the F-
statistics for the joint significance of the instruments are also highly significant across all estimations but one and 
the coefficient of determination ranges from 27 to 63%. 
With regard to instrumental exogeneity Table 2 also reports the Wald test, which tests whether the instrumented 
variables  are  in  fact  endogenous.  In  five  out  of  six  specifications  we  can  reject  the  null  hypothesis  of  no 
endogeneity, thus the IV approach seems to be correct.  Regarding the strength of the selected instruments, we 
tested against underidentification and weak instruments using the rk statistic derived in Kleibergen and Paap 
(2006) for non i.i.d. error terms.  
Tobit models are extremely sensitive to heteroskedastic error terms. If heteroskedasticity is present in the data, 
the estimates will be biased and inconsistent. Thus, we repeated our estimations using Powell‟s „Censored Least 
Absolute Deviations‟ (CLAD) estimator (Kilic et al., 2009), which is robust to heteroskedasticity. The estimation 
results are very similar to those reported in Table 2 and are available upon request.  
 
The results reported so far remain nearly identical when modifying the definition of price promotions. Instead of 
requiring a price reduction of more than 5 % for a maximum time span of four weeks, we experimented with 
2.5%, 7.5%, 10%, and 15% thresholds for time spans of three and five consecutive weeks, respectively. We also 
repeated our regressions using OLS, 2SLS and a Tobit model without instruments; the results remain unchanged 
and are available from the authors upon request. 
                                                 
7 The „segment size‟ for a particular brand is defined as the number of households that have the highest degree of loyalty 





Table 2: Influence of Brand Loyalty on Frequency and Depth of Promotions (IVTobit Model) 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
  Dependent Variable 
  Frequency of Price Promotions  Depth of Price Promotions 




*** (4.92)  0.245
*** (4.90)  0.232
*** (4.28)  0.147
*** (4.25)  0.473
*** (4.61)  0.429
*** (4.20) 
Degree of Brand Loyalty 
Average Length of Brand Run  -0.011
** (-2.97)          -0.022
** (-2.80) 
Repurchase Probability      -0.394
***(-4.28)          -0.786
***(-4.17) 
Return Probability          -0.299
***(-3.86)          -0.555
***(-3.80) 
Segment Size *1000  0.275
*** (4.06)  0.559
*** (4.91)  1.263
*** (5.41)  0.743
*** (5.41)  1.310
*** (5.63)  2.370
*** (3.36) 
Retail Chain Dummies 
Markant  -0.009   (-1.95)   -0.010
*  (-1.99)  -0.006  (-0.90)  -0.017  (-1.74)  -0.019  (-1.78)  -0.013    (-1.00) 
Metro  0.028
*** (6.87)  0.027
*** (6.11)  0.028


















***(-4.24)  -0.022  (-1.42)  -0.029  (-1.72)  -0.044
*    (-2.14) 






















Nestlé  0.013  (1.83)  -0.028
*  (-2.11)  -0.025
  (-1.75)  -0.029
*  (1.99)  -0.055
*  (-2.03)  -0.040   (-1.46) 
 
LL [LL(=0)]  -11203.49 [669.33]  -6030.16 [669.33]  -4581.84 [669.33]  -11959.83[20.44]     -6828.57  [20.44]  -5327.54  [20.44] 
Wald Test of Exogeneity  0.106    0.000    0.000    0.000    0.000    0.000 
N  1,729    1,729    1,729    1,729    1,729    1,729 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Remarks:  The reference category for the retail chain dummies is „Edeka‟, the reference category for the manufacturer dummies is „Dr. Oetker‟. t-values in 
parenthesis. 
* p < 0.05; 
** p < 0.01; 
*** p < 0.001 11 
 
 
5.  Conclusions 
 
Price promotions are important marketing activities for (food) retailers, particularly in Germany; brand loyalty is 
a major requisite to foster brands' assets. Several theoretical papers have analyzed the relationship between price 
promotions and brand loyalty resulting in mixed outcomes. With our study we intend to extend the few number 
of empirical studies for (European) grocery markets that are available to test which model(s) might be most 
relevant to reflect pricing strategies in food retailing. 
Earlier models by Raju et al. (1990), Rao (1991) and Agrawal (1996) assume in general that all consumers are 
loyal towards a specific brand, more recent studies  by Anderson and Kumar (2007), Ko￧aş and Bohlmann 
(2008), Jing and Wen (2008) include switching consumer segments. Ko￧aş and Bohlmann (2008) as well as Jing 
and Wen (2008) show that under certain conditions the weaker retailer promotes more often and offers a larger 
discount compared to the stronger brand. 
In this study we merge weekly retail scanner and daily consumer scan data for the German ready-to-eat breakfast 
cereals market to investigate the impact of brand loyalty on retailers‟ price promotional strategies. The key result 
of this study is that brand loyalty significantly influences the design of a price promotional strategy (even when 
taking into account that brand loyalty might be endogeneous as well as controlling for manufacturer and retail 
chain effects). For all three measures of brand loyalty (the average length of the brand run, the repurchase 
probability, and the return probability), we find strong empirical support for a negative impact of the degree of 
brand  loyalty  on  the  aggressiveness  of  promotional  strategies:  stronger  brands  tend  to  be  promoted  less 
frequently and price discounts are smaller, ceteris paribus. This results support the theoretical models presented 
by Ko￧aş and Bohlmann (2008) and Jing and Wen (2008). However, we also find a slight impact of the segment 
size that offsets the former relationship. Segment size (as well as the market share) of a particular brand is 
positively related to the frequency and depth of price reductions. These results would provide some evidence for 
the  model  by  Anderson  and  Kumar  (2007).  Considering  the  size  of  the  two  effects  the  first  relationship 
outweighs by far the second. An additional interpretations might be that the first relationship holds for the 
corporate brands while the latter is valid for the respective sub-brands, meaning that a corporate brand more 
likely promotes popular sub-brands.  
Although we have been able to explore the relationship between brand loyalty and price promotional strategies 
on the basis of a unique data set, a few caveats pertain. First, pricing decisions of retailers typically are made in a 
multi-product  environment  which  implies  a  complex  set  of  interactions  between  different  products.  These 
interactions are not addressed in the current study due to the obvious dimensionality issue for a large equation 
system, but are worthy for further investigation. Second, theoretical and empirical studies typically investigate 
the relationship between brand loyalty and promotional strategies in a static context. Data permitting, it would be 
interesting  to  learn  more  about  how  price  promotions  dynamically  influence  consumer  behavior  and  how 
changes in the degree of loyalty then feed back to pricing strategies. Analyzing the dynamics of the relationship 
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